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Fishery problems are still aboard the ship of state and continue to be
difficult to cast away. The inshore and long-range fishermen still have their
differences. The rovers have gained prestige with the enormous advance-
ment in almost everything relating to maritime operation, but the coastal
fishermen continue to produce the bulk of the American catch despite the
economists who do not seem to care if all of our fish are caught by
foreigners. Changes are occurring on land and in the sea in almost every
direction, yet there are lessons of the past that still may have a bearing on
ocean fisheries present and future, legally and otherwise. How has the
Department of State responded to the various legal fishery problems? Will
Mr. Nixon's reorganizations change it all?
Before submitting illustrative incidents in the departmental history con-
cerned with ocean fisheries, it might be well to mention some of the
attitudes and confrontations.
Fortunately, we start with Cordell Hull where original indifference was
followed by most aggressive and intelligent espousal of what was believed
to be in the protection of American fishery interests from Japanese attack.
A fishery division was created in the Department whose work, despite the
abolition of the division by Edward Stettinius, carried on and produced the
so-called Truman Proclamations.
The greatest claim that Mr. Stettinius had to fame - notoriety would be
a more accurate term - was his reorganization of the Department. It was
understood that he brought into the Department two "professional" orga-
nizers to do the job. When ready, they prepared a double-page diagram
which was published in the Sunday Edition of (of course) the Washington
Post.
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On Monday morning, a former member of the Department was heard to
make the remark that the diagram reminded him of a plan of the toilet
facilities of an apartment house, but he was perhaps prejudiced.
More pertinent were the responses of two Assistant Secretaries in-
terviewed separately. Each was asked why the fisheries branch (established
by Mr. Hull) was omitted. The first one somewhat evasively answered,
"Well, as far as the Department of State is concerned we could not see
what difference there was between a can of fish and a can of beans on a
grocer's shelf." Of course, he was asked whether it had not occurred to
him that the Department consider the possibility that it might not be
dealing with canned fish but with Russian, Japanese or Canadian fishing
vessels competing with our own out on the Pacific Ocean.
The other Assistant Secretary apologetically suggested that the Depart-
ment wished to have a symmetrical diagram, and there didn't seem to be
any place on it where fisheries fitted in.
For decades subsequent to World War I1, fisheries failed to regain the
relative importance which they had achieved under Mr. Hull. The position
of Special Assistant for Fish and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State
was created in 1948, but the common expression in Washington was that it
was not far enough up on the totem pole. Finally, in 1966, the position was
elevated to Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of
State (instead of the Under Secretary) with immediate increase in prestige
and power, in turn to be up-graded again in 1970. In the meantime, the
industry had dealt with the Department of the Interior for detail, and
turned largely to Congressmen for assistance.
In its handling of fishery matters, the Department was of course deeply
concerned with fishery commissions although at first it seemed to treat
them as independent agencies. In fact, there was real prestige in being an
international fish commissioner. When he came to Washington, he was
greeted and treated as if he were an ambassador.
It was a happy portent of cooperation between Canada and the United
States, that the first treaty into which Canada entered after becoming an
independent nation was that creating the International Fisheries Commis-
sion in 1924. (The name was changed to "International Pacific Halibut
Commission" after other fishery commissions were created.) It started with
only two members from each country, which was adequate, but because of
fishermen's pressure the number was later increased to three-with no
increase in efficiency however.
To the distinct advantage of the Commission, the term of office of its
members was indefinite, and some commissioners served for many years in
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spite of changes in the White House. Senator Schwellenbach once said to a
close personal friend: "How in Hell does a rank Republican like you hold
on to that fish commission job?" The answer was "Lew, I never was asked
a question easier to answer - the position carries no pay, no patronage
and no publicity. Tell me any of your damn Democrats who would take
that kind of a job?" Lew threw up his hands saying, "You win, you can
have it for life." As a matter of fact, his friend held it twenty-three years
before he resigned voluntarily to accept a different but also unpaid commis-
sionership.
There have been other devoted commissioners who have fought to keep
politics out of the commissions, but some smart official in the Department
a number of years ago discovered a political opportunity and, with or
without White House approval, (probably without even calling attention to
the previous practice of encouraging commissioners to stay on the job) sent
out requests (in effect demands) to all commissioners for resignations.
Subsequent Department officials ignored protests, and it is doubtful that
either the current United States President or his Secretary of State ever
even heard of the question, although the practice was once protested by
Senator Jackson. In 1969, the practice actually left only one commissioner
out of four to function on behalf of this country for most of the year.
Although the matter may not have come to the personal attention of any
Secretary of State, there have been times when members of the Depart-
ment have complained that West Coast commissioners were too in-
dependent. This was particularly true when the economists were influential
in the Department, but it goes back to early Commission history.
The original members of the Halibut Commission were the heads of
their respective fishery departments. Wilbur A. Found and Henry
O'Malley, both competent men with other responsibilities than the Com-
mission recognized the competence of the two western members. These
were Miller Freeman of the State of Washington and John Pease Babcock
of British Columbia. These aggressive individuals plunged right in and set
the precedent of dominance of the Commission by its coastal members.
When the International Pacific Salmon Commission was created in 1937, it
was again the western members who took the leadership.
Gradually, and not unnaturally as some of the functioning became more
routine, Ottawa and Washington bureaucracy crept into the picture. But
this hardly justifies the injection of party politics into the Commission.
The apparent indifference shown two years ago about filling the va-
cancies on the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission may have
been partly due to some confusion prevailing in the Department of the
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 4
624 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
Interior, as well as an attitude that the commissions should not be treated
as independent agencies.
One of the two outstanding fishery aspects of the Cordell Hull adminis-
tration (which started in 1933), relates to the Japanese threat at that period
to North Pacific Ocean fisheries, particularly salmon, their perpetuation
and the question as to who should get the fish. (With some variation, the
Japanese threat in both respects still exists and has been augmented by
South Korean and other threats.) The other aspect, that is, general fishery
policy considered from a broader range, eventually produced the so-called
Truman Proclamations, one of which particularly pertained to fisheries,
whose inception, though signed by President Truman in 1945, goes back to
the Hull r6gime.
From a lawyer's point of view, it is significant that the quality of the
legal division of the Department of State was outstanding in the time of
Cordell Hull. Judge R. Walton Moore (technically not in the Legal Ad-
viser's office, but certainly close to it) was Counselor. He had been an
eminent jurist, had served as an Assistant Secretary, and as Counselor he
became the Secretary's confidant. Green H. Hackworth was Legal Ad-
viser. He was later to become a judge of the International Court of Justice.
William R. Valiance organized the Inter-American Bar Association. Wil-
liam W. Bishop, Jr. was to become an outstanding professor of In-
ternational Law and editor of the American Journal of International Law.
He is mentioned specifically, not only because of his ability, but because he
was largely responsible for the drafting of the Truman Proclamations.
There were others too who also acquired distinction.
Some lawyers show remarkable ability in telling clients what they cannot
do; others try to help their clients by telling them what might succeed.
So Mr. Hull and his staff, once they understood the factual situation, set
out to see what could be done. Immediately of course, they encountered
the two ghosts which for years have seemed to haunt this field of in-
ternational law-"freedom of the seas" and "the three mile rule."
One of Mr. Hull's farsighted comments was:
It is my view that the question of the possible extension of the present
three-mile limit for territorial waters should not be dismissed simply because
that limit has heretofore been largely accepted.
And President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested to Judge Moore that he
proceed forthwith to the study of the possibility of adopting a new policy
relating to the off-shore fisheries in Alaska-based on the President's
assertion that every nation has the right to protect its own food supply in
waters adjacent to its coast. One need not be impressed (Judge Moore
apparently was not) with his further suggestion "that a Presidential procla-
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mation closing the sea areas along the Alaskan coast to all fishing -
Japanese, Canadian and American - might be a way out" (4 WHITEMAN
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 945).
Some four centuries ago, Hugo Grotius promoted the concept of "free-
dom of the seas." The "three-mile rule" was a reaction to the limitless
scope of freedom of the seas to the effect that a nation should at least own
some stretch of water along its own coast.
Grotius believed that the stocks of fish in the seas were inexhaustible,
and in his day, when ocean fishing was from rowboats and sailboats, it was
not unreasonable for him to include fishing along with navigation in his
advocacy of freedom of the seas. He was a practical lawyer as well as a
Dutch citizen, and undoubtedly wished to uphold the right of the Dutch
herring fleet to continue its profitable fishing off the British and Scottish
shores, as well as the right of the Dutch merchant fleet to frequent the East
Indies. But in these days, with mechanical power, navigation aids,
efficiency devices, 100,000-ton ships, so that any nation can send
self-maintaining fishing fleets anywhere in world waters, there is striking
differentiation between the terms "fishing" and "navigation." This basic
difference was effectively pointed out by the American Bar Association in
a resolution adopted in 1964, and was at last, though reluctantly, conceded
by the Navy and State Departments, when Congress in 1966 enacted the
law asserting our right to extend fishery protection nine miles beyond
three, while leaving freedom of navigation unaffected.
Another phase of legal rights pertinent to the fishery situation is "histor-
ic rights." Historic bays have been recognized for many years, and their
existence has been available as precedents for asserting claims to appli-
cable waters. Shortly before World War 1I, the head of a company which
was understood to be a joint British-Norwegian combination, proposed to
send a large mother-ship and a fleet of catcher boats across the Atlantic,
through the Panama Canal, up the Pacific Coast to British Columbia's
latitude, stay three miles off shore and rake the halibut banks. He was
belligerent when this was protested. He threatened to call on the British
Navy if there were any interferences with his plan, but when the matter
was taken up with the British and Norwegian Governments, that was the
end of the threat.
The United States and Canada set new fishery courses when they
revised the International Fisheries Treaty in 1930. The Commission as
originally created, had only research power. Then this body of two mem-
bers from each country (subject, of course, to approval of the executive of
each nation) took over the management of the entire eastern Pacific halibut
fishery both within the territorial limits of each country and as far out as
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the fishery extended, about a hundred miles, all on the continental shelf.
The sadly depleted halibut fishery was restored, a remarkable accom-
plishment.
The International Fisheries Commission (the word "Halibut" was later
inserted in the name to distinguish it from later commissions dealing with
other fish) skillfully conducted work of research and restoration which in
1953 fell within the scope of the North Pacific Fisheries Treaty known as
the Tripartite Treaty. This latter treaty, while good in some respects, had
weaknesses imposed upon its inception by the Department economists
pursuant to which some years later the Halibut Commission, to the detri-
ment of the entire fishery, was forced to give up an important sector of its
management. Bad as this was, it did serve a useful purpose in demon-
strating what can be accomplished in conservation management of an
ocean fishery when it covers practically the entire fishery, and what lack of
efficiency can follow if any substantial portion of the area is thrown wide
open.
Some departmental lawyers seem to have been beguiled by the saying
that there is no such thing as prescription in maritime law, so they refused
to utilize the available precedents. When in 195 1 the famous case of Great
Britain v. Norway (I.C.J. Reports (1951) (16)) was before the In-
ternational Court of Justice, members of the Legal Adviser's office scoffed
at the very thought that Norway could establish an historic right to a
portion of what they considered to be a part of the high seas (such as Vert
Fjord)-but she did. Perhaps some of Mr. Hull's successors might have
accomplished more for the American fishing industry, had they been as
assertive of their own country's interests as were Norway's representa-
tives.
One reason why Cordell Hull legal staff outshone some of its early
successors, and should be remembered even today, is that it was not
intimidated by the repetition of the phrases "three-mile rule" or "freedom
of the seas." Yet, without repudiating them, and avoided to some extent at
least, their unreasonable application. In the case of meeting the Japanese
threat of invading our coastal salmon fishery in the 1930s, the Department
strongly asserted claims which in essence amounted to historic rights.
The Truman Proclamations of 1945 circumvented the unlimited appli-
cation of freedom of the seas, by extending the United States' claims of
special rights to coastal fisheries outside of the territorial sea, as is evident
from the official news release accompanying the fishery proclamation:
As a result of the establishment of this new policy, the United States will be
able to protect effectively, for instance, its most valuable fishery, that for the
Alaskan salmon.
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It should also be noted that this last proclamation was accompanied by a
directive to the Secretaries of State and Interior, forthwith to implement
the proclamation. Each Secretary took it on himself to obey and implement
the other proclamation which might result in the production of oil with all
that that implies, but to ignore the one protecting fisheries.
So there have been differences of opinion within the Department. The
economists did not seem to care whether we or the Japanese would get the
fish. Their position was expressed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Willard Thorp:
There is one point at which the policy is not clear - the extent to which it i!
a form of protectionism, keeping American fishing areas exclusively fol
Americans. One fundamental principle in this area is that of equal access t(
resources.
Turning now to the background of these historic moves, we find that by
1930 Japan, naturally a fishing nation, had developed a small group of large
powerful fish companies which were pressing their government to support
them in expanding their fishing operations across the Pacific Ocean. Unfor-
tuantely, officials of the United States had seemingly acquiesced in, or al
least had not objected to, allowing Japanese boats to fish in Bristol Bay,
Alaska, for crabs on the basis of an unofficial understanding that they
would not fish for salmon.
At that time, the Pacific Coast salmon fishery was about the most
prosperous fishery in the country. It now shows strong signs of revival
unless again attacked from abroad. Salmon canning started in California in
1864 and in Alaska in 1878, so that commercial salmon fisheries had been
pursued many decades by North American fishermen without interference
from the' Japanese or anyone else, inshore or offshore. Repeatedly salmon-
industry representatives sought to point out to the Department of State
the difference, not only historically, but also physically, between the North
Pacific fisheries and the North Atlantic, and the opportunities to develop
international law to promote practical conservation as well as our national
interests.
Pacific salmon have the peculiar life history of being spawned in fresh
water streams or lakes, then go to sea and finally endeavor to return to the
very place of their birth, in turn to spawn and die. Because they can easily
be exterminated from a spawning area, their catching must be rigorously
regulated. Inasmuch as international law, despite Grotius' implication of
divinity, is man-made law, it borders on audacity to assert that freedom ol
the seas is such a limitless and immutable legal principle that it must be
interpreted as upholding the right in perpetuity of any foreign nation to
annihilate important fisheries of any coastal nation merely by keeping its
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fish boats three miles offshore. Yet this is what the Japanese contention
amounted to and still amounts to. It is even supported today by some of
our fishery people who wish to fish without restraint close to the shores of
other nations. It would hardly seem that our nation should be so impotent
that it could not do anything to meet such a situation. In Church v.
Hubbart, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 187, 234 (1804), Chief Justice Marshall said:
Its (a nation's) power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised
beyond the limits of its territory...
It is an interesting story how the Japanese, starting to fish off Alaska
about the beginning of the 1930s for crab, expanded to ground fish, then
surreptitiously began catching salmon, their vessels staying well out of
sight of shore; how the United States Bureau of Fisheries not only ignored
the situation, but actually made false charges against the Alaskan canners
for even complaining about the neglect; how one Assistant Secretary of
State even rebuked a fishery complainant, telling him, "Why, the Japanese
are the best friends we have in the world"; but how an aggressive cannery
man took a fisherman's union official and a photographer, flew in an
airplane out over Bristol Bay, caught and photographed Japanese right in
the act of salmon fishing.
In the meantime, United States Senator Louis B. Schwellenbach of the
State of Washington assembled facts and law into a speech in the Senate,
which pointed out the failure of the Department of State to deal with the
situation. After learning of Senator Schwellenbach's speech, Mr. Hull
invited him with two industry representatives who were conversant with
the fishery problems, to a conference at which, after a thorough discussion,
he assured the Senator of immediate attention.
The Department did go right to work. Largely under the guidance of
Judge Moore, but with the active interest of Mr. Hull himself, it was
decided to proceed along two lines, first to give immediate attention to
saving the salmon industry from the then present Japanese threat, and after
that to develop a long-term fishery policy. Through United States Am-
bassador Grew at Tokyo, Mr. Hull submitted to Japan a remarkable
document, firm but reasonable. It ignored both the three-mile rule and
freedom of the seas, and while it presented reason and international moral-
ity, it also relied on established historic rights as is evidenced by the
following excerpts:
The cost of the extensive efforts made by the Government to regulate salmon
fishing and to perpetuate the supply of salmon has been borne by the Ameri-
can people, and not infrequently American fishermen have suffered loss of
employment and income as a result of the various restrictions imposed.
Because of such sacrifices, and the part that American citizens have played in
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bearing the cost of conserving and perpetuating the salmon resources, it is the
strong conviction and thus far unchallenged view on the part of millions of
American citizens on the Pacific Coast interested in the salmon industry and
on the part of the American public generally that there has been established a
superior interest and claim in the salmon resources of Alaska.
Having in mind the high importance of the Alaska salmon fisheries as an
industry fostered and perpetuated through the efforts and economic sacrifices
of the American people, the American Government believes that the safe-
guarding of these resources involves important principles of equity and jus-
tice. It must be taken as a sound principle of justice that an industry such as
described which has been built up by the nationals of one country cannot in
fairness be left to be destroyed by the nationals of other countries. The
American Government believes that the right or obligation to protect the
Alaska salmon fisheries is not only overwhelmingly sustained by conditions
of their development and perpetuation, but that it is a matter which must be
regarded as important in the comity of the nations concerned.
Mr. Hull's tactics proved effective. To be sure the Japanese did not
affirmatively concede our claims, but they did agree to terminate their
program of salmon research in Bristol Bay which had so greatly disturbed
the people of the Pacific Northwest. They also agreed not again to issue
any licenses to fish for salmon in Bristol Bay. This certainly was a diplo-
matic triumph.
Then came World War i, with its destruction of Japanese fish boats,
and after that General Douglas MacArthur, whose policy was to restore
Japan's fishing industry in order to provide a badly-needed food supply, at
the same time that he held the operations within reasonable geographic
bounds. Although the Japanese would like to have been turned loose to fish
wherever they pleased, they seemed at that time to be appreciative of the
consideration shown them.
When it came time for negotiating the peace treaty with Japan, the whole
Pacific Coast industry was suspicious as to the Department's intentions.
The meeting was scheduled for San Francisco. Edward Stettinius, Jr. when
he had succeeded Cordell Hull as Secretary of State, had abolished the
excellent fishery division which Mr. Hull had built up, and turned fisheries
largely over to economists with their substitution of theory for practical
administration. The industry was uncertain what would happen. Southern
California tuna boat captains, with their "talkies" carrying their voices
back and forth, threatened to cruise north, form a line through the Golden
Gate, disembark near the foot of Market Street, march to the convention
hall and demand protection.
The salmon industry considered this to be a favorable time to send a
representative to Washington. When he arrived, Dean Acheson had al-
ready left for San Francisco, but Undersecretary James Webb was greatly
disturbed over the California threat, and was anxious to head off trouble al
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the conference; so he wrote a somewhat remarkable letter to the head of
the coastal fishing industry confirming his oral assurance that a fishery
conference would be held as soon as possible after the peace treaty was
negotiated, that industry members would be included in the delegation, and
that the Department would support a form of fishery treaty which had been
gone over with industry. This, although not satisfactory to the industry,
seemed to be the best the economists would let get by. It was the basis for
what later became known as "abstention."
In the meantime, under two reorganization laws which the President had
pushed through Congress, the Bureau of Fisheries had been transferred
from the Department of Commerce to the Department of the Interior, and
the Biological Survey from the Department of Agriculture also to Interior.
The ubiquitous Mr. Ickes had them combined into the Fish and Wildlife
Service. So on June 5, 1943, still to enlarge his domain, Mr. Ickes wrote to
the President:
I draw your attention to the importance of the Continental Shelf not only to
the defense of our country, but more particularly as a storehouse of natural
resources .... The Continental Shelf extending some 100 to 150 miles from
our shores forms a fine breeding place for fish of all kinds; it is an excellent
hiding place for submarines; and since it is a continuation of our continent, it
probably contains oil and other resources .... I suggest the advisability of
laying the ground work now for availing ourselves fully of the riches in this
submerged land and in the waters over them.
He then suggested collaboration with other government departments, in-
cluding State. Roosevelt responded:
I think Harold Ickes has the right slant on this-I have felt that the old
three-mile limit or twenty-mile limit should be superseded by a rule of
common sense.
He suggested setting up a board to follow up the notion.
On June 10, 1943, Cordell Hull informed the President:
I find that there has already been formed within the Department a committee
to study various angles of this very problem.
He advised Breckenridge Long, who had the work well in hand, of the
inquiry. Meetings were held, which included Mr. Bishop, Mr. Sturgeon,
Mr. Dooman and others. Interdepartmental meetings were held, to some of
which Mr. Keenleyside of Canada's External Affairs Department was
invited. Two proclamations were drafted and issued by President Truman
on September 28, 1945. The Continental Shelf Proclamation provided:
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
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seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the
United States, subject to its regulation and control (emphasis added).
It also provided:
The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the
right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.
The Fishery Proclamation provided for the establishment of
... conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the
coasts of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the
future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such
activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its
nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly
bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the
regulation and control of the United States (There is provision for when the
activity has been joint, e.g., the United States and Canada (emphasis
added) ).
It also provided:
The character of the high seas of the areas in which such conservation zones
are established and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no
way thus affected.
It is evident that the two proclamations were drafted by the same skillful
hand and were coordinated; that the one was to maintain this country's
interest in the resources of the continental shelf, the other the United
States' interest in the coastal fisheries in the waters above this bottom, but
both without interfering with freedom of navigation. It is interesting to note
that both employ the potent word "control" which the enemies of the
Fishery Proclamation attempted sedulously to ignore.
It must be remembered that Mr. Stettinius not only abolished the fishery
branch of the Department, and that although there still were some com-
petent people left, the entire atmosphere was different insofar as fisheries
were concerned. The fisheries work was placed far down on the economic
side of the Department, subject to the control and supervision of econo-
mists.
One of the objectives of the fishing industry subsequent to the closure by
Secretary Stettinius of the fishery division created by Secretary Hull, was
to restore the division. Finally, when General George K. Marshall was
Secretary of State, a large group of Pacific Northwest fishery people called
on him pursuant to appointment. He met the group cordially, heard their
plea and gave his assurance of prompt action. The group returned home
highly elated over their success - but nothing happened. At industry's
request, Senator Warren Magnuson, learning that the matter had been
referred to Undersecretary Robert Lovett arranged for a meeting with him.
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At the meeting, Mr. Lovett sat at one end of a table, Senator Magnuson
at the other end. Next to Mr. Lovett sat Senator Saltonstall, and next to
him was Senator Morse. After formalities, Mr. Lovett, who is a highly
respected person, seemingly started to talk, but soon disclosed that he was
reading from a report the substance of which was that fisheries had been
receiving diligent attention from highly qualified interested experts - the
difficulty was that the industry did not understand how the State Depart-
ment functioned. Senator Saltonstall interrupted Mr. Lovett, calling atten-
tion to the interest his State of Massachusetts had in fisheries, yet though
he was a United States Senator he had been unable to find anyone in the
Department who was posted on fisheries, or seemed to have any interest in
or knowledge of the subject.
Then Senator Morse said that as everyone knew, his State of Oregon
was greatly involved in fisheries but his experience was the same as that
of Senator Saltonstall; in fact he turned to one of the industry representa-
tives present saying, "You and I have been over here together a number of
times with no success, have we not?"
Then Senator Magnuson spoke up in his customary direct manner: "No,
Bob, you have evidently been misled. You must be reading from a paper
prepared for you by . . . " turning to the same industry representa-
tive... "What's the name of that stuffed shirt we have had so much
trouble with?" The name was supplied. "That's the guy." Mr. Lovett threw
up his arms saying, "Boys, you've got me," and the fishery division was
re-established.
The Continental Shelf Proclamation developed into one of the four
treaties prepared by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
at Geneva in 1958. It naturally pleased the petroleum industry, and in fact,
had fairly general appeal.
Although the two proclamations were largely prepared in the days of
Cordell Hull, the Stettinius administration had intervened before their
issuance by Mr. Truman, and had created an entirely different atmosphere
in the Department of State. The Department appeared to have become
dominated by the international economists who considered themselves
great humanitarians ready to give away the United States. While our
Pacific Coast fishermen were urging protection of our whole coastal
fisheries, these geniuses concocted the doctrine of the inherent universal
right of access to all the world's natural resources.
This is illustrated by a colloquy between a fishery representative and the
economist who was presiding at a hearing in the Department. The
fishing-industry representative was urging that steps be taken to forestall
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 4
Law, Fish and Policy 633
Japan's entry into our salmon and halibut fisheries. The economist asserted
that the Japanese had a perfect right to enter these fisheries. When asked
whether he meant that they would have the right to bring their fish boats
into Puget Sound to fish for salmon, his answer was "Certainly." The same
answer was given as to Japanese fishing for striped bass in San Francisco
Bay and as to catfish in the Mississippi. One more question was asked:
whether they would have the right to come up the Mississippi River, and
plant and harvest corn in Iowa or Illinois. The answer was that if they
could find suitable land there not in use, they would have the right to come
in and farm it.
And so, when the peace treaty with Japan was to be negotiated in San
Francisco, and representatives of the Pacific Coast went to Secretary of
State Dean Acheson to plead for fishery protection in the treaty, the plea
was firmly rejected, and the only pertinent provision in the treaty was that
there should be a subsequent conference on fisheries - with no other
commitment by Japan on the subject except their agreement to attend a
conference.
About this time where was pending in the International Court of Justice,
a case brought by the United Kingdom against Norway, attacking the
validity under international law of the claims of Norway to extend its
ocean-fishery jurisdiction. The opinion rendered December 18, 1951 was
contrary to the then Department of State's views in two respects: First, it
recognized Norway's claim to a four-mile width for its territorial sea - in
fact, the United Kingdom conceded this despite its previous strong con-
tention that the width of territorial seas should be only three miles, a
position which the United States is at last abandoning. Second, and most
important, it recognized Norway's right to establish boundaries which
included large expanses of ocean waters which would have been consid-
ered high seas except for the fact that they had been claimed for such a
long period of time that the court held that an historic right to them had
been established to exclusive fishing rights outside the borderline of four
miles from shore.
It is most interesting to note that the United States member of the
Court, the eminent Judge Hackworth, gave as his reason for concurring in
the judgment in favor of Norway,
that he considers that the Norwegian government has proved the existence of
an historic title to the disputed area of water.
The great significance of this World-Court decision is that under in-
ternational law, title to ocean areas can be established by historic assertion.
Both before and subsequent to the decision, fishing interests of the Pacific
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Northwest contended that the United States and Canada had established
historic rights to the salmon and halibut fisheries which had been pursued
by them exclusively for almost a century, and which had been subjected to
extensive biological research resulting in the placing of severe conservation
restraints on the fishermen of the two countries for decades. The assertions
herein referred to made by Cordell Hull as to salmon, and by Canada and
the United States as to halibut, were available precedents. However, Cor-
dell Hull's successors could not be induced to follow up these assertions.
Both the Department of State and the Department of the Interior failed
to comply with President Truman's Executive Order to implement the
Fishery Proclamation. The Department of State even continued to assert
the policy that no fishery rights could be established beyond territorial seas
except by treaty until the twelve-mile fishery bill was passed by Congress
in 1966.
Following the war, came the Japanese fishery-treaty negotiations which
were somewhat hampered by the influence in the Department then as-
sumed by the economists. It was in connection with this treaty that the
term "abstention" became current - that when a coastal nation is subject-
ing a coastal fishery to scientific research and management, and is making
reasonably full use of it on a sustained conservation basis, fishermen of
other nations shall stay out.
Abstention was a source of controversy at the Rome fisheries confer-
ence in 1955, at the Geneva "Law of the Sea" conference of 1958, and
elsewhere. It offended the economists' theory of the inherent universal
right of access to all natural resources. When asserted as a right, abstention
came into direct conflict with the legal concept stubbornly held for many
years, almost as a hobby, by some members of the legal staff, that it was an
absolute impossibility for any legal right to exist beyond territorial waters
where it might run afoul of "freedom of the seas." Naturally, those fishery
operators who wished for no restriction on their fishing as close as possible
to the shores of all nations throughout the world, heartily, and incidentally
skillfully, supported this position. Also, the Navy supported this position
until it was pointed out that freedom of the seas for navigation had no
necessary application to fisheries.
When the 1958 Geneva Treaty was sent to the Senate, it precipitated a
covert war between the proponents of abstention and its opponents. The
Department left the matter in the hands of the Legal Adviser, who fortu-
nately was a competent international lawyer. Neither side knew where he
stood in the matter. So on the afternoon preceding the meeting which he
called, the six Senators from Alaska, Washington and Oregon (except one
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Oregon Senator who was sick but was represented) met in Senator Jack-
son's office, and agreed that if a reservation favorable to abstention were
not approved, they would carry the fight to the floor of the Senate.
Armed with this assurance, the abstention advocate entered the fray and
came out victorious. When the treaty came up, a provision was attached
which the proponents considered to be a reservation, but the opponents
called an understanding.
Toward the end of the United Nations Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1958, the United States delegation - and particularly its able
leader, Arthur H. Dean, with the approval of the then Under Secretary of
State, Christian A. Herter, made a sincere and aggressive attempt to rescue
the principle of abstention from the undercover onslaught it had received,
partly from antagonistic United States interests. It was too late. It should
be noted that the primary objective of the United States at Geneva was to
secure agreement for narrow territorial seas, to interfere with navigation as
little as possible, but as no distinction was made between freedom of the
seas for navigation and for fishing as well as for some non-related reasons,
our efforts were in vain.
So coastal-fisheries protection made little progress until the American
Bar Association, by its resolution, pointed out the fundamental distinction
between these two divergent kinds of freedom.
Then came the hopeful incident of passage of the Twelve Mile Fishery
Law in 1966, by which the fundamental distinction between freedom of the
seas for navigation and freedom of the seas to enable exploiters of one
country to deplete the coastal fisheries of other nations was recognized. In
order for the Department of State to agree to extend fishery jurisdiction
from three to twelve miles, it was necessary to drop as obsolete the
position that except by treaty no fishery rights could lawfully extend
beyond the territorial sea. Now that this obstruction is eliminated, there is
hope for even greater coastal fishery protection. A coastal nation is, of
course, much more apt to be interested in the permanent conservation of a
fishery along its own coast than those exploiting fisheries from abroad.
It is true that the enemies of extended fishery protection were able to get
written into the Geneva treaties (including the fisheries treaty) repeated
endorsements of freedom of the seas, but the advice and consent of the
United States Senate to ratification was qualified by an understanding or
reservation preserving the right of this country to support the principle of
abstention; and the recent North Sea continental-shelf decision of the
World Court points out that international law is not wholly dependent on
treaties for its existence. It is possible that in some subsequent United
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Nations conference a sufficient number of nations may be enlisted who are
interested in saving the enormous food resources of the sea to eliminate the
iniquitous limitation on world-wide fishery protection, if the present able
lawyers of our own Department of State will take the lead.
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